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Abstract 
 
The term post-truth has become the 2016 Oxford dictionary word of the year, yet many scholars 
question whether we are truly living in a post-truth world, or whether lying has always been a part 
of politics and the media. Considerable discussion has surrounded the concept of post-truth and its 
ǀalue iŶ eǆplaiŶiŶg the UK͛s ǀote to eǆit the EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ. Some literatures engaging with the 
term question whether proclaiming of a new ͚post-tƌuth͛ era may be overstated.  This paper seeks to 
contributes to this discussion by critically evaluating the extent to which the Brexit referendum, the 
UK͛s people ǀote to eǆit the EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ was based on post-truth politics. The paper develops 
the argument that Brexit is a key example of post-truth politics, and that two key factors ushered in 
this new form of politics into the UK: 1)  how literatures proclaiming the advent of post-truth in the 
UK to explain Brexit focus on technological changes associated with social media, which lead to a 
situation when a significant portion of the population acquire their news online, while anybody can 
post anything online without that there would be any checks on the accuracy of the claims. 2) before 
examining the historical roots ofA rising distrust in democratic institutions, political elites, expertise, 
and traditional media gatekeepers which lead to a situation when the population no longer trusts 
established expert knowledge and is willing to rely on information originating from questionable 
sources.  in the UK that may have contributed to the way in which the vote proceeded.  It concludes 
that tThise combination of a decline in trust of politicians and experts with technological 
advancessocial media reliance, has driven the public to emotionally charged, value-based decision 
making. Our analysis of the Brexit referendum raises the need for scholars to study the daily 
activities of the population, and focus on its role as an active regime shaper.This compounded with a 
lack in trust of media gatekeepers and easy access to unreliable information produces an unusual 
and unique set of circumstances that makes the question of a post-truth era far more convincing.  
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Introduction 
 
The Brexit campaign was distinct from other referendums or elections because of the unexpectedly 
high turnout from voters who do not normally vote in general elections. The voter turnout for the 
referendum was 72.2%.i This is in comparison to a 68.8% turnout in the 2017 General Election 
(Electoral Commission, 2016). YouGov polling (YouGov, YouGov on the day poll: Remain 52%, Leave 
48%, 2016) predicted a 52% result in favour of remain with a 48% leave vote and the telegraph poll 
predicted a 51% remain vote to 49% leave (Dunford & Kirk, 2016). Granted these showed a remain 
victory by a relatively small margin, but pollsters across the country predicted a remain victory. The 
leave vote took everyone by surprise. “oŵe of the eǆplaŶatioŶ foƌ pollsteƌs͛ eƌƌor might be due to 
the fact that predictions by YouGov, for example, were partially based on whether respondents had 
voted in the last general election. A higher turnout particularly in the North contributed to the 
miscalculation of the result (YouGov, Unexpectedly high turnout in Leave areas pushed the campaign 
to victory, 2016). Electorates who do not normally vote, voted in the EU referendum, and they voted 
leave.  This raises the question of what motivated the high turnout. 1.2 million previously 
disengaged voters evidently found the leave message more convincing.  
This paper develops the claim that the leave vote was motivated by post-truth politics, a politics 
which seeks to emit messages into the public domain which will lead to emotionally charged 
reactions, with the goal of having them spread widely and without concern for the accuracy of the 
messages provided. This form of politics has been made possible by two developments: 1) The 
development and widespread usage of social media for acquiring information, and 2) a growing 
distrust in traditional elites, and expertise. Technological changes in the nature of news and 
information dispersal have occurred. New technologies of communication have usurped the role of 
traditional gatekeepers in filtering, checking and monitoring the information which reaches the 
public, and ensuring a degree of accuracy.  The quantity of knowledge and information combined 
with the lack of means for gatekeeping makes a potentially toxic environment for assessing the 
credibility of truth claims. The role of technological change is thus central to arguments proclaiming 
a post-truth era. Although information has become easier to attain and is available in 
unprecedented quantities, there is less capacity to determine what is reliable or factual. Secondly, at 
least since the war in Iraq, and following several other crises, such as the 2008 financial crisis the 
population has lost its respect for traditional elites and gatekeepers. As a result, emotionally charged 
voting has become more prevalent. Together these conditions have created a fertile ground for 
post-truth politics to spread. We need to acknowledge the active role the population plays in this 
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new form of politics. It is primarily the population who decides to share and respond to false news 
messages, thus promoting their online popularity. Individual users decide to use social media for 
acquiring information, they decide not to verify the sources that are emitting that information, and 
they vote based on value-laden decisions. Scholars of politics and international relations need to pay 
more attention to the everyday activities of ordinary citizens and how those shape political 
decisions, and potentially even political regimes. Ultimately, the public need to be informed and 
educated about the conditions that underwrite proclamations of a post-truth era and recognise their 
role in their creation and here I agree with Higgins and her emphasis on awareness as the solution 
(Higgins, 2016).  The evidence that the UK is at the tail end of a significant decline in trust should give 
us pause.  A political crisis of trust has been developing for decades and is now well entrenched 
within the population. The form of democracy is clearly not satisfying the public anymore.  It is this 
that I believe is beyond the simple ebbs and flow of a democratic society. This decline of trust is 
significant and has uniquely hit both governments and experts. The media gatekeepers are equally 
not trusted, which leaves actions based on value-based decisions, with whatever information is 
decided by a reader to be reliable.  This compounded with technological changes is what makes this 
a post-truth era. Individually all of these factors are perhaps not new and definitely do not warrant 
the declaration of a new era. However, when you end up with a public disillusioned with the 
government and experts, a gatekeeper that no longer does its job and technology that makes any 
information easily accessible; it is then that the idea of a post-truth era can be entertained. Further 
consideration needs to be given iŶto the ƌeasoŶs ďehiŶd the puďliĐ͛s distƌust iŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt aŶd 
politicians, to fully recognise and therefore address the challenge to democracy that we are being 
faced today.   
The 24th June Brexit Referendum in the UK can be interpreted as a marker of a new age of post-truth 
politics, in which facts, expertise and merit have become less valued than they were in the past 
(Gaston, 2016).  A range of commentators in the UK argue that the leave campaign knowingly 
disseminated lies into the public domain, the media perpetuated them, and echo chambers 
reinforced them in the minds of voters. Matthew d͛AŶĐoŶa ;ϮϬϭϳͿ sees the Brexit vote as marking a 
new age of politics, in which the rise of populism associated with the Leave vote has devalued claims 
to objective truth.  The evidence he presents for this argument stems from reading the Brexit 
campaign, as well as that of Donald Trump, as having been rife with evident falsehoods (d'Ancona, 
2017).  d͛AŶĐoŶa aƌgues that the problem is a lack of demand for facts and expertise in the current 
climate.  He observes that iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ ͛͞eǆpeƌts͛ aƌe ǀilified as an ill-intentioned cartel rather than a 
souƌĐe of ǀeƌifiaďle iŶfoƌŵatioŶ͟ (d'Ancona, 2017). D͛AŶĐoŶa aŶŶouŶĐes the age iŶ ǁhiĐh 
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͞Rrationality is threatened by emotion, diversity by Ŷatiǀisŵ, liďeƌtǇ ďǇ a dƌift toǁaƌds autoĐƌaĐǇ…at 
the heaƌt…is a Đƌash iŶ the ǀalue of tƌuth, Đoŵpaƌaďle to the Đollapse of a ĐuƌƌeŶĐǇ oƌ a stoĐk͟ 
(d'Ancona, 2017, p. 4). The age of populism is marked by a condition of epistemological relativism, in 
which facts are determined as true according to the value perspective from which they are viewed 
(Lynch, 2011, p. 88). IŶ ϭϵϵϮ “teǀe TeisĐh iŶ his aƌtiĐle ͞The GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt of Lies͟ described the 
condition of ͞post-truth͟ as the result of a choice by the American people to live in a society that 
does Ŷot ǁaŶt to kŶoǁ the tƌuth aŶd fƌeelǇ saĐƌifiĐes it.  TeisĐh aƌgued that the puďliĐ͛s ƌeaĐtioŶ to 
Watergate and the publics quick pardoning of NixoŶ ŵeaŶt, ͞We Đaŵe to eƋuate tƌuth ǁith ďad 
Ŷeǁs aŶd ǁe didŶ͛t ǁaŶt ďad Ŷeǁs aŶǇŵoƌe, Ŷo ŵatteƌ hoǁ tƌue oƌ ǀital to ouƌ health as a ŶatioŶ. 
We looked to ouƌ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt to pƌoteĐt us fƌoŵ the tƌuth͟ ;TeisĐh, ϭϵϵϮ, p. ϭϯͿ.  He observed that 
the puďliĐ͛s ƌeaĐtion to the Iran-Contra affair was similarly to unquestioningly accept President 
ReagaŶ͛s ƌeasoŶiŶg ďehiŶd the sĐaŶdal, ͞PƌesideŶt ‘eagaŶ peƌĐeiǀed ĐoƌƌeĐtlǇ that the puďliĐ ƌeallǇ 
didŶ͛t ǁaŶt to kŶoǁ the tƌuth. “o he lied to us, ďut he didŶ͛t haǀe to ǁoƌk hard at it. He sensed that 
ǁe ǁould gladlǇ aĐĐept his loss of ŵeŵoƌǇ as aŶ aliďi͟ ;TeisĐh, ϭϵϵϮ, p. ϭϮͿ.  This appears to be the 
first time a ͚post-tƌuth͛ eƌa was announced, in which the people ͞ decided that we want to live in 
some post-tƌuth ǁoƌld͟ ;TesiĐh, ϭϵϵϮ, p. ϭϯͿ.   
The UK has seen a wave of declarations of a new post-truth era in recent years. Gaston , writing for 
Demos, argues that ͞the age of post-truth politics fetishizes simple, not effective, plans – and 
rewards those bold enough to promise them͟ (Gaston, 2016). According to tThe Economist argued 
that ͞the teƌŵ piĐks out the heaƌt of ǁhat is Ŷeǁ: the tƌuth is Ŷot falsified, oƌ ĐoŶtested, ďut of 
secondary importance͟ (The Economist, 2016). D͛AŶĐoŶa aŶŶouŶĐes the age iŶ ǁhiĐh ͞ƌatioŶalitǇ is 
thƌeateŶed ďǇ eŵotioŶ, diǀeƌsitǇ ďǇ Ŷatiǀisŵ, liďeƌtǇ ďǇ a dƌift toǁaƌds autoĐƌaĐǇ…at the heaƌt…is a 
crash in the value of truth, comparable to the collapse of a ĐuƌƌeŶĐǇ oƌ a stoĐk.͟ (d'Ancona, 2017, p. 
4). Although each of these declarations focuses on different elements of this so-called post-truth 
era, the common thread is an epochal change in attitudes towards truth. ,I devaluing it͛s role in 
society is devalued,and in favour of something else. The Oxford Dictionary seeks to states what that 
͞something else͟ is when it defines post-tƌuth as ͞ƌelatiŶg to oƌ deŶotiŶg ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes iŶ ǁhiĐh 
objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal 
belief͟. (Oxford Dictionary, 2018).  
In the UK, debates around a post-truth era have circulated around the 24th June UK Brexit 
Referendum, with a widespread implication that this event was a marker of this new age in which 
facts, expertise and merit have become less valued than they were in the past (Gaston, 2016).  A 
range of commentators in the UK argue that the leave campaign knowingly disseminated lies into 
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the public domain, the media perpetuated them, and echo chambers reinforced them in the minds 
of voters. Mattheǁ d͛AŶĐoŶa ;ϮϬϭϳͿ, sees the Brexit vote as marking a new age of politics, in which 
the rise of populism, associated with the Leave vote, has devalued claims to objective truth.  The 
evidence he presents for this argument stems from reading the Brexit campaign, as well as that of 
Donald Trump, as having been rife with evident falsehoods  (d'Ancona, 2017).  d͛AŶĐoŶa aƌgues that 
the problem is a lack of demand for facts and expertise in the current climate.  He observes that, 
iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ ͛͞eǆpeƌts͛ aƌe ǀilified as an ill-intentioned cartel rather than a source of verifiable 
information.  ͚Daƌe to kŶoǁ͛ ǁas IŵŵaŶuel KaŶt͛s pƌoposed ŵotto foƌ the EŶlighteŶŵeŶt.  TodaǇ͛s 
ĐouŶteƌpaƌt is ͚Daƌe Ŷot to͛͟ (d'Ancona, 2017).  His argument offers a comparison with the 
Enlightenment, in which he argued politics was motivated by an inquisitive mentality, in which ideas, 
concepts and aims ultimately propelled the political world forward. The age of populism is marked 
by a condition of epistemological relativism, in which facts are determined as true according to the 
value perspective from which they are viewed (Lynch, 2011, p. 88).  
It is often implicit to such arguments that what sets the modern daǇ ͚post-tƌuth͛ ĐoŶditioŶ apaƌt 
from the day to day lying of politicians is the decline of traditional media gatekeepers and the 
unique role of social media in exacerbating this condition. In the UK, the Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport released aŶ iŶteƌiŵ ƌepoƌt oŶ ͚DisiŶfoƌŵatioŶ aŶd ͚fake Ŷeǁs͛ 
͛ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdiŶg the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ǁoƌk ǁith eǆpeƌts to Đƌeate Đƌediďle staŶdaƌds foƌ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ that 
adapt to deal with the fast-moving technological developments (Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee, 2018, p. 64). This highlights changes in the nature of news and information dispersal. 
Suiter (2016) argues, in this vein, that ͞under the older logic politicians and journalists were co-
dependent for coverage and for content with journalists playing a gatekeeping role. The new Web 
2.0-hybrid model, which includes social media, blogs, reality TV and so on, negates much of this. 
Politicians can now communicate directly with the electorate. At the same time trust in the older 
institutions in both politics and media is continuously declining. Scepticism of the establishment is 
suĐh that ŵaŶǇ ďelieǀe little the ŵedia saǇs͟ (Suiter, 2016, p. 26).  Ultimately, new technologies of 
communication have usurped the role of traditional gatekeepers in filtering, checking and 
monitoring the information which reaches the public.  The quantity of knowledge and information 
combined with the lack of means for gatekeeping makes a potentially toxic environment for 
assessing the credibility of truth claims. 
The role of technological change is thus central to arguments proclaiming a post-truth era. According 
to an Ofcom report 64% of UK adults today use the internet to get their news and amongst 16-24 
year olds that number is even higher at 82% (Ofcom, 2018, p. 2). Furthermore, social media is the 
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most popular type of online news, with 44% of UK adults using it (Ofcom, 2018, p. 2). Online news is 
ŵoƌe likelǇ to ĐoŶtaiŶ ƋuestioŶaďle ĐoŶteŶt aŶd uŶƌeliaďle souƌĐes, ďut aĐĐoƌdiŶg to OfĐoŵ ͞ǁhile 
lots of people are able to recall the social media site they consumed the news on, some struggle to 
remember the original source of the news story.͟ (Ofcom, 2018, p. 2) 
Although information has become easier to attain and is available in unprecedented quantities, 
there is less capacity to determine what is reliable or factual. Furthermore, when the internet is 
utilised for fact checking, studies have found that once adopted, misinformation is inherently 
difficult to correct, particularly if it supports a viewpoint already held (Nyhan, 2007). According to a 
poll carried out with Oxford University over half of respondents prefer to access news through 
search engines, social media or news aggregators (interfaces that use ranking algorithms to select 
stories), rather than interfaces driven by humans (homepage, email and mobile notifications) 
(Newman, 2018). This is likely to be because the news accessed through these platforms tends to 
align with consumers existing views. 
This article asks to what degree declarations of a post-truth era provides adequate readings of 
thecontributes to these proclamations by developing an argument about the extent to which the 
UK͛s Brexit referendum to exit the European Union has been shaped by post-truth politics.  The 
paper first develops a theoretical argument of how technological changes towards the increased use 
of social media for news acquisition, and an increasing distrust in political elites and scientific 
expertise create the conditions of possibility for post-truth politics. Second it characterises the public 
debate surrounding the Brexit referendum, and highlights its highly divisive nature, as well as the 
fact that the population primarily remembered lies issued by the Leave campaign. Third the paper 
aƌgues that the Leaǀe ĐaŵpaigŶ͛s suĐĐessful stƌategǇ ǁas due to a foĐus oŶ soĐial ŵedia ŵessagiŶg. 
The papeƌ theŶ pƌoǀides eǀideŶĐe aďout the puďliĐ͛s gƌadual deĐƌease iŶ tƌust iŶ tƌaditioŶal politiĐal 
elites and scientific expertise over the last deĐade, ǁhiĐh ǁas at the oƌigiŶ of the puďliĐ͛s 
susceptibility to emotional voting. The papeƌ͛s last seĐtioŶ highlights the establishment͛s effoƌts to 
avert the arrival of a post-truth era. It concludes by raising some points of concern with the 
contemporary strategy and raises the need for scholars to study the daily activities of the 
population, and focus on its role as an active regime shaper. Literatures engaging with the concept 
of post truth in the context of the Brexit referendum tend to focus on technological change, but also 
to observe a generic rise in value-based decision making. It considers polling and public opinion to 
substantiate a unique shift in voting attitude and then seeks to provide rationale for this shift. The 
shift in itself provides some evidence for a post-truth era, this supported by other authors and 
studies on the use of technology in Brexit, the public mentality to distinguishing truthful information 
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further emphasis the possibility of a post-truth era. The following section examines the evidence 
that the Brexit Campaign was indeed characterised by a lack of concern for facts, and the role that 
technological change played, before addressing the broader evidence for rising distrust in UK 
democratic institutions that contextualised the value-oriented temper of the vote.  
The Role of Technology and Distrust in Political Elites for Creating the 
Conditions of Possibility for Post-Truth Politics  
 
The post-truth politics that have marked the Brexit referendum campaign have been made possible 
by two distinct conditions of possibility. First, technological innovations have resulted in new ways of 
disseminating information, which infringe upon the role of traditional media as gatekeepers for 
ensuring the accuracy of the information that gets disseminated widely. Second, a rising distrust 
against political elites, traditional media, and expert knowledge leads people to rely on alternative 
sources of information and to emotionally charged and value-laden decision-making. ͞Under the 
older logic politicians and journalists were co-dependent for coverage and for content with 
journalists playing a gatekeeping role. The new Web 2.0-hybrid model, which includes social media, 
blogs, reality TV and so on, negates much of this. Politicians can now communicate directly with the 
electorate. At the same time trust in the older institutions in both politics and media is continuously 
deĐliŶiŶg. “ĐeptiĐisŵ of the estaďlishŵeŶt is suĐh that ŵaŶǇ ďelieǀe little the ŵedia saǇs͟ (Suiter, 
2016, p. 26).   
Firstly, the wide use of social media to acquire information infringes upon the role of traditional 
media such as broadcasting, TV, and newspapers as mediators, and consequently gatekeepers for 
the dissemination of information. Anyone can post anything on social media, whether the message 
disseminates widely depends on how often it gets shared, not on how accurate it is. According to an 
analysis of 126,000 twitter stories, tweeted by around 3 million people more than 4.5 million times 
false stoƌies diffused ͞sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ faƌtheƌ, fasteƌ, deepeƌ aŶd ŵoƌe ďƌoadlǇ thaŶ the tƌuth iŶ all 
Đategoƌies of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ͟ (Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018, p. 1146). False news is more interesting and 
novel and hence is shared and perpetuated throughout twitter in a way that the truth is not. The 
news disseminated through social media reaches a large portion of the population. According to a 
poll carried out with Oxford University over half of respondents prefer to access news through 
search engines, social media or news aggregators (interfaces that use ranking algorithms to select 
stories), rather than interfaces driven by humans (homepage, email and mobile notifications) 
(Newman, 2018). Furthermore, readers might not by themselves be able to sufficiently judge the 
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accuracy of the news stories they are reading on social media sites. According to a study from LSE 
although readers ǁidelǇ aĐkŶoǁledged that ͚tƌaditioŶal Đues͛ ;data ƌeliaďilitǇ, authoƌ, spelliŶg aŶd 
tone) are superior for forming an opinion on the reliability of the story, even highly educated 
individuals used ͚ŵodeƌŶist Đues͛ ;pƌeseŶtatioŶ, Ŷuŵďeƌ of shaƌes, Ŷuŵďeƌ of similar articles, 
alignment with pre-existing knowledge) more widely when evaluating the accuracy of news stories 
(Ho, Marot-Achillas, Mortlock, & Zeng). AĐĐoƌdiŶg to OfĐoŵ ͞ǁhile lots of people aƌe aďle to ƌeĐall 
the social media site they consumed the news on, some struggle to remember the original source of 
the Ŷeǁs stoƌǇ͟ (Ofcom, 2018, p. 2). What compounds this issue is that the social media space 
functions like an echo chamber, meaning that confirmation bias occurs more easily within the online 
sphere. People have friends who have similar opinions as they do, and so they only ever access a 
proportion of the news that are trending online, the proportion that is most similar to their own 
views. Algorithms on platforms like Facebook and YouTube further compound the difficulties, 
because they create filter bubbles, as people see online content that is most similar to their previous 
browsing history (Vicario, Zollo, Caldarelli, & Scala, 2017, p. 8).  Moreover, the confirmation bias 
suggests once people have adopted misinformation, it is inherently difficult to correct that 
misinformation, particularly if it supports a viewpoint already held (Nyhan, 2007). In sum, changes in 
the media environment towards an increasing role for social media have created fertile ground for 
the flourishing of post-truth politics. 
Second, a rising lack of trust in traditional elites and expertise further compounds the difficulties and 
creates opportunities for a rise in post-truth politics. Trust can be defined in a political context as the 
͞judgeŵeŶt of the ĐitizeŶƌǇ that the sǇsteŵ aŶd the politiĐal iŶĐuŵďeŶts aƌe ƌespoŶsiǀe aŶd ǁill do 
what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny͟ (Miller & Listhaug, 1990, p. 358). In practice 
political elites create policies and they either receive trust from those citizens who are satisfied with 
the policies or cynicism from those who are not (Citrin, 1974).  Trust is important for the functioning 
of a liberal democracy, but a healthy degree of scepticism is also vital: ͞sĐeptiĐisŵ stiŵulates 
political engagement and signals a willingness to judge political institutions by their own merits͟ 
(Meer, 2017). Yet when the scepticism reaches too far and transforms into distrust, ͞distƌust, ŵaǇ 
inspire vigilance in and monitoring of a relationship, uncooperative behaviour, or the severing of a 
relationship͟ (Levi & Stoker, 2000). Instead of vigilance, apathy and uncooperative behaviour can 
emerge. This condition forms a fertile ground for the emergence of post-truth politics and protest 
votes.  
In the remainder of this article we will demonstrate that the Brexit campaign took shape on the basis 
of these two preconditions, and post-truth politics shaped the campaign in significant ways.   
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The Public Debate Surrounding the Brexit Referendum 
 
The Brexit campaign was very divisive. Both sides actively accused each other of dishonesty and 
scaremongering, and these discursive tactics did little to inspire trust from the public in the debate 
as a whole. The manner, in which politicians behaved in the referendum campaign ǁas ͞diǀisiǀe, 
antagonistic and hyper-partisaŶ…͟ (Moore & Ramsay, 2017, p. 168). The public were encouraged to 
distrust political messaging based on constant back and forth accusations.  
And yet, the three key messages the public remembered from the referendum campaign ͞ǁeƌe 
components of key arguments belonging to Brexiters.  1. The UK sends £350m per week to the EU, 2. 
Net migration to the UK had hit 333,000, 3. Turkey and other candidate countries joining the EU.  
These controversial topics were hugely salient in the press as well as in personal debates that took 
plaĐe͟ (Joyce, Brexit Data: Post-Truth Politics and the EU, 2017). The narrative of the Vote Leave 
campaign had traction with the public in a way the Vote Remain campaign did not, irrespective of 
the puďliĐs͛ appaƌeŶt distƌust of ŵost offiĐial ŵessages. 
At the same time, it is worth noting that the three key messages the public remembered are 
misleading at best, outright false at worst. For example, the Leaǀe side͛s widely publicised claim that 
͞The UK seŶds £ϯϱϬ ŵillioŶ peƌ ǁeek to the EU is ǁƌoŶg…This figuƌe does Ŷot iŶĐlude ƌeďate, or 
discount on what the UK has to pay. In 2014 the UK would have paid £18.8 billion without the rebate 
but ended up paying £14.4 billion.  The estimate for 2015 is £12.9 billion. This is £248 million per 
ǁeek, oƌ £ϯϱ ŵillioŶ peƌ daǇ͟ (FullFact, Vote Leave "facts" leaflet: Membership Fee, 2016).  Yet, in an 
opinion poll 47% of respondents thought this message was accurate (whatukthinks, 2016).  Further, 
the leave campaign argued that Turkey was going to join the EU, and Turkish workers would flood 
the British labour market. Yet, Turkey might at best join the EU several decades from now  
(Scarpetta, 2016), while 58% of respondents in an opinion poll thought it was ͞ǀeƌǇ likelǇ͟ oƌ ͞faiƌlǇ 
likelǇ͟ that TuƌkeǇ ǁas goiŶg to joiŶ the EU ǁithiŶ the Ŷeǆt deĐade (whatukthinks, 2016). The data 
makes it obvious that post-truth politics has shaped the UK͛s Bƌeǆit deďate iŶ sigŶifiĐaŶt ǁaǇs. In the 
next section, we will highlight how social media usage has contributed to this development.  
Technology and the Brexit Campaign. 
 
Whilst misinformation in election and referendum campaigns is not a new phenomenon, the 
ubiquity and ease with which information is distributed and found through the means of the internet 
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and social media multiplies the problem by an unprecedented amount. The social media strategy of 
the Leave campaign played an important role in driving the swing to Leave. The Leave campaign 
spent the majority of its resources on direct digital communication. Dominic Cumming seŶt ͞ŶeaƌlǇ a 
ďillioŶ taƌgeted digital adǀeƌts…aŶd alŵost all ouƌ ŵoŶeǇ iŶto digital ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ͟ (Cummings, 
2016). Data from Twitter suggest that the social media marketing strategy of the leave vote was 
successful: According to Brandwatch over the 31 days before the referendum, twitter indicated a 
sigŶifiĐaŶt sǁiŶg to the leaǀe side ďased oŶ ͞#ǀoteƌeŵaiŶ͟ aŶd ͞#ǀoteleaǀe͟ as shown in figure 1.  
This data also shows a total of over 1 million tweets regarding the EU referendum in the final run up 
to the referendum (Joyce, Brexit Data: Post-Truth Politics and the EU, 2017). 
Figure 1 - (Joyce, Brexit Data: Post-Truth Politics and the EU, 2017) 
 
The Leave campaign may have used political bots, which are ͞Đoŵputeƌ-generated programs that 
post, tweet, or message of their own accord͟ (Howard & kollanyi, 2016, p. 1).  Howard and Kollanyi 
;ϮϬϭϲͿ fouŶd ͞that politiĐal ďots ha[d] a sŵall, ďut stƌategiĐ ƌole iŶ the ƌefeƌeŶduŵ ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶs; ;ϭͿ 
the faŵilǇ of hashtags assoĐiated ǁith the aƌguŵeŶt foƌ leaǀiŶg the EU doŵiŶate… (3) less than 1% 
of saŵpled aĐĐouŶts geŶeƌate alŵost a thiƌd of all the ŵessages͟ (Howard & kollanyi, 2016, p. 1).  
These political bots were typically linked to the Leave Vote. Of the top ten accounts most active on 
the Brexit issue ͞it is alŵost certain that 7/10 accounts are bots.  One of them is a UKIP-curated 
aĐĐouŶt ŵost pƌoďaďlǇ ǁith soŵe leǀel of autoŵatioŶ…͟ (Howard & kollanyi, 2016, p. 4).  Research 
suggests that with respect to the dissemination of information on twitter specifically, not only was a 
significant proportion bot produced, but this content was unreliable and heavily weighted in favour 
of the vote leave campaign. ͚Leaǀe͛ bots contributed to the high level of Brexit engagement in the 
social media sphere. The leave campaign, through online investment may have been ͞able to create 
the perception of wide-ranging public support for their cause that acted like a self-fulfilling 
pƌopheĐǇ, attƌaĐtiŶg ŵaŶǇ ŵoƌe ǀoteƌs to ďaĐk Bƌeǆit͟ (Polonski, 2016). 
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Large proportions of the UK population will have engaged with the Leave campaign on social media. 
According to an Ofcom report 64% of UK adults today use the internet to get their news and 
amongst 16-24 year olds that number is even higher at 82% (Ofcom, 2018, p. 2). Furthermore, social 
media is the most popular type of online news, with 44% of UK adults using it (Ofcom, 2018, p. 2). 
Furthermore, when the internet is utilised for fact checking, studies have found that once adopted, 
misinformation is inherently difficult to correct, particularly if it supports a viewpoint already held 
(Nyhan, 2007). According to a poll carried out with Oxford University over half of respondents prefer 
to access news through search engines, social media or news aggregators (interfaces that use 
ranking algorithms to select stories), rather than interfaces driven by humans (homepage, email and 
mobile notifications) (Newman, 2018). This is likely to be because the news accessed through these 
platforms tends to align with consumers existing views. 
What set the Brexit campaign apart from other referendums or elections was the unexpected high 
turnout from voters who did not normally vote in general elections. The voter turnout for the 
referendum was 72.2% this is in comparison to a 68.8% turnout in the 2017 General Election 
(Electoral Commission, 2016). YouGov polling (YouGov, 2016) predicted a 52% result in favour of 
remain with a 48% leave vote and the telegraph poll predicted a 51% remain vote to 49% leave 
(Dunford & Kirk, 2016), granted these showed a remain victory by a small margin, but this reflected 
the opinion of pollsters across the country. Some of the explanation for pollsters error is likely due to 
the fact that predictions by YouGov, for example were partially based on whether respondents had 
voted in the last general election, so a higher turnout particularly in the North contributed to the 
miscalculation of the result (YouGov, 2016). EleĐtoƌates ǁho doŶ͛t ŶoƌŵallǇ ǀote, ǀoted iŶ the EU 
referendum, and voted leave.  This raises the question of what motivated the high turnout. 1.2 
million previously disengaged voters evidently found the leave message more convincing.  
An implicit assumption in the literatures above is that new technologies had a critical impact in this 
context. The evidence, however, is ambiguous. Fact checking websites found both sides told half-
truths or outrights lies over issues such as the economy and immigration during the Brexit Campaign 
(FullFact, 2016).  Foƌ eǆaŵple, oŶ the leaǀe side the ǁidelǇ puďliĐised Đlaiŵ that ͞The UK seŶds £ϯϱϬ 
ŵillioŶ peƌ ǁeek to the EU is ǁƌoŶg…This figuƌe does Ŷot iŶĐlude ƌeďate, oƌ disĐouŶt on what the UK 
has to pay. In 2014 the UK would have paid £18.8 billion without the rebate but ended up paying 
£14.4 billion.  The estimate for 2015 is £12.9 billion. This is £248 million per week, or £35 million per 
daǇ͟ (FullFact, 2016).  However, when asked if this was true or false a majority of 47% of people said 
they thought it was true (whatukthinks, 2016).  Further, the leave campaign promoted the 
suggestion that Turkey was going to join the EU.  OpenEurope stated with respect to this statement, 
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͞the poiŶt aďout EU eŶlaƌgeŵeŶt is, hoǁeǀeƌ, Đleaƌ.  TuƌkeǇ is, at ďest, deĐades off joiŶiŶg the EU.͟  
(Scarpetta, 2016)  OŶĐe agaiŶ ǁheŶ the puďliĐ ǁeƌe asked ͚Hoǁ likelǇ or unlikely do you think it is 
that TuƌkeǇ ǁill joiŶ the EU iŶ the Ŷeǆt ϭϬ Ǉeaƌs?͛ aŶd giǀeŶ a ƌaŶge of ĐhoiĐes fƌoŵ ͚ǀeƌǇ likelǇ͛ to 
͚ǀeƌǇ uŶlikelǇ͛ the ŵajoƌitǇ ;total ϱϴ%Ϳ said ͚ǀeƌǇ likelǇ͛ oƌ ͚faiƌlǇ likelǇ͛ (whatukthinks, 2016).  These 
were two very key arguments for the leave campaign and are both clearly untrue.  
Conversely, many of the claims made by the remain campaign were also exaggerated or incorrect, 
for example fact checker OpenEurope stated with respect to some of the economic arguments 
pƌeseŶted ďǇ the TƌeasuƌǇ; ͞Oǀeƌall, it is faiƌ to saǇ theƌe ǁill ďe a shoƌt-term shock but going much 
beyond that is ultimately speculation. There are also a number of particularly pessimistic 
assumptions in the Treasury report which do not seem entirely realistic, especially around the policy 
response and the impact of the transitional effeĐt ǁhiĐh ŵeaŶs ďuǇiŶg iŶto the TƌeasuƌǇ͛s loŶgeƌ 
teƌŵ pƌediĐtioŶs aŶd ďasiŶg ďusiŶess deĐisioŶs oŶ theŵ͟ (Ruparel, 2016).  
Both sides actively accused the other of dishonesty and scaremongering, and irrespective of reality, 
this did little to inspire trust from the public in the debate as a whole. The manner in which 
politiĐiaŶs ďehaǀed iŶ theiƌ eleĐtioŶ ĐaŵpaigŶs ǁas ͞diǀisiǀe, aŶtagoŶistiĐ aŶd hǇpeƌ-paƌtisaŶ…aŶd 
yet much of the acrimony, partiality and suspicions of dishonesty that characterised the campaign 
has ƌeŵaiŶed.͟ (Moore & Ramsay, 2017, p. 168). The public were encouraged to distrust political 
messaging by the constant back and forth accusations and little upfront information. Drew Western 
wrote that voters who don͛t have enough reliable information to help them decide how to vote, 
naturally voted by personal conviction and with emotion (Western, 2007).  
This seeŵs iŶ paƌt ĐoŶfiƌŵed ǁheŶ the puďliĐ ǁeƌe asked ͚Aƌe politiĐiaŶs fƌoŵ ďoth the Leaǀe aŶd 
‘eŵaiŶ ĐaŵpaigŶ ŵostlǇ telliŶg tƌuth oƌ lies?͛ aŶd a ŵajoƌitǇ of ϰϲ% said ͚ŵostlǇ telliŶg lies͛ 
Đoŵpaƌed to oŶlǇ ϭϵ% ǁho said ͚ŵostlǇ telliŶg the tƌuth͛ (whatukthink, 2016).  However, when 
asked ͚Whose opiŶioŶs haǀe iŶflueŶĐed Ǉouƌ deĐisioŶ oŶ hoǁ to ǀote iŶ the ƌefeƌeŶduŵ?͛ oŶlǇ Ϯϰ% 
of the puďliĐ said ͚EĐoŶoŵists, aĐadeŵiĐs aŶd otheƌ eǆpeƌts͛, ǁith ͚FƌieŶds aŶd FaŵilǇ͛ takiŶg ϮϬ% of 
the ǀote, ͚Bƌitish politiĐiaŶs͛ ϭϱ% aŶd ͚ŶoŶe of these͛ a ŵajoƌitǇ at ϰϱ% (whatukthinks, 2016).  This 
gives a unique insight into not only public mentality at the time, but also some of the conclusions 
that were made as a result. It is established that the public considered the government to be lying. 
Across both remain and leave campaigns and this is not a new phenomenon. What is interesting is 
that the reaction of the public is not to seek expert opinion or even to consider the thoughts of 
friends and family in a substantive way. However, it also did not result in inaction, in fact the 
opposite, it resulted in a higher voter turn out resulting in the leave vote.   
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It seems clear that the narrative of the Vote Leave campaign had traction with the public in a way 
the Vote Remain campaign did not, irrespective of the publics͛ apparent distrust of most official 
messages. According to Brandwatch over the 31 days before the referendum, twitter indicated a 
sigŶifiĐaŶt sǁiŶg to the leaǀe side ďased oŶ ͞#ǀoteƌeŵaiŶ͟ aŶd ͞#ǀoteleaǀe͟ as shoǁŶ iŶ figuƌe ϭ.  
This data also shows a total of over 1 million tweets regarding the EU referendum on the final run up 
to the referendum (Joyce, 2017).  This indicates a wide range of discussion surrounding the topic.  As 
disĐussed ďǇ BƌaŶdǁatĐh; ͞AĐĐoƌdiŶg to YouGoǀ, the top thƌee ƌeŵeŵďeƌed eǀeŶts iŶ the lead up to 
the EU Referendum were components of key arguments belonging to Brexiteers.  1. The UK sends 
£350m per week to the EU, 2. Net migration to the UK had hit 333,000, 3. Turkey and other 
candidate countries joining the EU.  These controversial topics were hugely salient in the press as 
ǁell as iŶ peƌsoŶal deďates that took plaĐe͟ (Joyce, 2017)  It has since been proven by several fact 
checkers that there is no evidence for Turkey joining the EU anytime in the near future (Fullfact, 
2016) and the figure of the amount the UK sends to the EU was wildly overestimated (Fullfact, 2016).   
 
Figure 1 - (Joyce, 2017) 
 
What fostered the reach and traction of the core messages of the Leave campaign distributed online 
is a point of contention in existing literatures. Whilst misinformation and campaigns are not a new 
phenomenon, the ubiquity and ease at which information is distributed and found through the 
means of the internet and other technology, multiplies the problem by an unprecedented amount. 
Technology is perceived to have played an unprecedented role in driving the swing to Leave. 
Evidence may be found in that the majority of the Leave campaigns resources were spent on Direct 
digital communication, with Dominic CuŵŵiŶg͛s statiŶg he seŶt ͞ŶeaƌlǇ a ďillioŶ taƌgeted digital 
adǀeƌts…aŶd alŵost all ouƌ ŵoŶeǇ iŶto digital ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ͟ (Cummings, 2016). A result of the 
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perception that social media swung the vote has been that platforms such as Facebook have since 
came under fire for failing to effectively manage or exercise oversight regarding the factual basis of 
online content, for example refusing to take down pages that deny the Holocaust (Gibbons, 2018) , 
and cross-party MPs were recently quoted arguing tech firms like Facebook, Twitter and Google 
should be held legally accountable for the distribution of false content on their sites (Buchan, 2018). 
The problem of false or misleading content, however, applied to all sides of the referendum debate, 
where dubious or slanted information was disseminated. 
The UK government DCMS͛s interim report on DisiŶforŵatioŶ aŶd ͚fake Ŷeǁs͛ in July 2018 argued 
that the ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes ĐaŶ ďe ͚deǀastatiŶg͛ if soĐial ŵedia is used to spƌead ƌuŵouƌs aŶd ͚fake Ŷeǁs͛ 
and acknowledges that motives could include influencing political elections (Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sport Committee, 2018). What is seen to compound this issue is that the social media space 
functions like an echo chamber, meaning that confirmation bias occurs more easily within the online 
sphere. Algorithms on platforms like Facebook and YouTube facilitate the aggregation of individuals 
and their common ideas resulting in little debate or alternative information (Vicario, et al., 2017, p. 
8).  Furthermore, a study from LSE looked at the factors that resulted in readers considering a source 
of information reliable or unreliable. They found that even though it was widely acknowledged that 
͚tƌaditioŶal Đues͛ (data reliability, author, spelling and tone) as a method of forming an opinion on 
ƌeliaďilitǇ ǁas supeƌioƌ; ͚ŵodeƌŶist Đues͛ ;pƌeseŶtatioŶ, Ŷuŵďeƌ of shaƌes, Ŷuŵďeƌ of siŵilaƌ aƌtiĐles, 
alignment with pre-existing knowledge) were more widely used. Even by highly educated individuals. 
(Ho, et al., n.d.) Perhaps the most significant study was published in 2018, in which over 126,000 
twitter stories, tweeted by around 3 million people more than 4.5 million times were investigated 
for their truth and their distribution across twitter. The research found that false stories diffused 
͞sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ faƌtheƌ, fasteƌ, deepeƌ aŶd ŵoƌe ďƌoadlǇ thaŶ the tƌuth iŶ all Đategoƌies of 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ͟ (Vosoughi, et al., 2018, p. 1146) it was suggested that false news was more interesting 
and novel and hence was shared and perpetuated throughout twitter in a way that the truth wasn͛t.  
The influence of political bots, which are ͞Đoŵputeƌ-generated programs that post, tweet, or 
message of their own accord,͟ ŵaǇ haǀe ďeeŶ ŵoƌe sigŶifiĐaŶt  (Howard & kollanyi, 2016, p. 1).  
Hoǁaƌd aŶd KollaŶǇi ;ϮϬϭϲͿ, fouŶd ͞that politiĐal ďots ha[d] a sŵall, ďut stƌategiĐ ƌole iŶ the 
referendum conversations; (1) the family of hashtags associated with the argument for leaving the 
EU doŵiŶate…;ϯͿ less thaŶ ϭ% of saŵpled aĐĐouŶts geŶeƌate alŵost a thiƌd of all the ŵessages͟ 
(Howard & kollanyi, 2016, p. 1).  Howard and Kollanyi found that these political bots were often not 
iŵpaƌtial ďut liŶked to Đuƌated aĐĐouŶts, of the top teŶ aĐĐouŶts ŵost aĐtiǀe oŶ the Bƌeǆit issue; ͞it 
is almost certain that 7/10 accounts are bots.  One of them is a UKIP-curated account most probably 
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ǁith soŵe leǀel of autoŵatioŶ…͟ (Howard & kollanyi, 2016, p. 4).  Research suggests that with 
respect to the dissemination of information on twitter specifically, not only was a significant 
proportion bot produced, but this content was unreliable and heavily weighted in favour of the vote 
leave campaign.   
This suggests that it is possible that ͚Leave͛ bots contributed to the high level of Brexit saturation in 
the social media sphere.  However, it is worth recognising that ͞oŶ the ǁhole the top users do not 
geŶeƌate Ŷeǁ ĐoŶteŶt, ďut siŵplǇ ƌetǁeet ĐoŶteŶt fƌoŵ otheƌ useƌs͟ (Howard & kollanyi, 2016). 
Bots reinforce content already available on social media, which may or may not to be impartial or 
factual.   Furthermore, even if the majority of content on twitter was bot created, it is still being 
viewed, liked and retweeted by the public. The leave campaign, through online investment may have 
been ͞able to create the perception of wide-ranging public support for their cause that acted like a 
self-fulfilliŶg pƌopheĐǇ, attƌaĐtiŶg ŵaŶǇ ŵoƌe ǀoteƌs to ďaĐk Bƌeǆit͟ (Polonski, 2016). But again, the 
implication is that Bots reinforce existing tendencies or accelerate trends online, they do not create 
them.  
It is difficult to see how the impact of social media investment by campaigns can be managed or 
prevented without problematic consequences. Algorithms that seek to manage Bot activities online 
can make two kinds of errors. Disinformation may be incorrectly labelled as correct and bot accounts 
may be identified as human and vice versa (Bontcheva, 2018). The high volume of posts, on average 
6,000 per second, will inevitably leaǀe a lot of poteŶtiallǇ iŶĐoƌƌeĐt iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ͚iŶ the ǁild͛ 
(Bontcheva, 2018). The alternative is where a platform intervenes in a case which does not need 
censorship and correct or accurate information is removed from the public domain. This may result 
in a user having their post taken down, but on a more significant level some valuable, accurate 
information about an election being removed or an account being shut down (Bontcheva, 2018).  
While the social media environment might have been decisive for the Brexit referendum, As Suiter 
notes,  traditional media coverage clearly also contributed to the muddying of the distinction 
between fact and fiction, inasmuch as it emphasiseds ďalaŶĐe iŶ ƌepoƌtiŶg deďates: ͞This so-called 
͚false ďalaŶĐe͛ iŶ Ŷeǁs ƌepoƌtiŶg ǁheƌe jouƌŶalists siŵplǇ alloǁ ďoth sides to aƌgue ǁith oŶe aŶotheƌ 
without asserting the facts means truth becomes a matter of opinion or assertion not fact. This was 
clear iŶ the BBC͛s Đoǀeƌage of Bƌeǆit thƌough the aĐĐeptaŶĐe of asseƌtioŶs, fƌoŵ ďoth sides of the 
aƌguŵeŶt, ǁithout eǀideŶĐe͟ (Suiter, 2016, p. 27).  The RISJ/PRIME research found that in sampled 
national print newspapers there ǁas a ͞doŵiŶaŶt pƌo-Bƌeǆit ďias͟ (Moore & Ramsay, 2017, p. 2).  
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The challenge, therefore, especially given an ambiguous evidence base for the role of new media 
technology in swinging the vote towards Leave, is that the public have the right to decide what 
information they read and absorb and to make their own decisions based on whatever criteria they 
choose, and this may be value-based. A surfeit of incorrect or misleading information, inasmuch as it 
may be fostered by technological developments, becomes ͚daŶgeƌous͛ when it accompanies such an 
existing shift towards value-based decision making. This supports the declaration of a ͚post-tƌuth͛ 
era only inasmuch as a changing relationship between democracy and technology appears to be an 
inevitable consequence of communicative abundance (Keane, 2018). What provides further 
evidence is the public opinion, demonstrated clearly in polling. It shows a distrust in politicians, but 
also a move away from getting information from so called experts. There could be many reasons for 
this, including separate events such as the 2008 financial crash, or the Iraq war, but these events just 
act as contributing factors to a change in public opinion not just towards government, but an 
attitude to ͚tƌuth͛. This is ǁhat dƌoǀe the Bƌeǆit deďate.  
Assessing a decline of political trust in the UK 
The public opinion identified in polling further underlines that post-truth politics have driven the 
Brexit referendum. The data show a distrust in politicians, but also a move away from getting 
information from so called experts. There could be many reasons for this, including separate events 
such as the 2008 financial crash, or the Iraq war. 
A rise in ͚value-based͛ decision making is revealed in polling in the lead up to the EU referendum 
ǁhiĐh iŶdiĐated ǀotiŶg iŶteŶtioŶs ǁeƌe ďased Ŷot oŶ faĐts oƌ eǀideŶĐe ďut oŶ ͚heaƌt͛. When pollsters 
asking the public about ͚the ǁaǇ Ǉou iŶteŶded to ǀote, to ǁhat eǆteŶt do Ǉou ďelieǀe that your 
deĐisioŶ is ďased ;oŶ a peƌĐeŶtage sĐale ǀaƌǇiŶg ďetǁeeŶͿ ͚ϭϬϬ% ǁith ŵǇ heaƌt͛, ͚ϱϬ% of eaĐh͛ aŶd 
͚ϭϬϬ% ǁith ŵǇ head͛.  OŶlǇ ϱ% of the public sampled said ͚ϭϬϬ% ǁith ŵǇ heaƌt͛ aŶd 17% said ͚ϭϬϬ% 
ǁith ŵǇ head͛ but ϯϱ% said ͚ϱϬ% of eaĐh͛ (whatukthinks, 2016).  This suggests that evidence based 
considerations were, for many, no more important than gut instinct and emotion. This suggests that 
at the heart of the debate, values were being disputed rather than facts (Gillett, 2017). For those 
declaring the rise of a post-truth era, this ͚ƌesuƌgeŶĐe of eŵotioŶal Ŷaƌƌatiǀe͛ combined with the 
technology of the internet – ͚the all-important primary, indispensable engine of post-tƌuth͛ pƌoduces 
a formula for echo chambers and ultimately the indifference of the public  (Crilley, 2018).  
Gillett (2017) argues that the concept of a post-truth era fails to capture what is at stake in here.  He 
argues that both the election of Trump and Brexit were symptoms of debates in which ͞ǀalues ǁeƌe 
ďeiŶg ĐoŶtested ƌatheƌ thaŶ faĐts.͟ (Gillett, 2017) . Gillett argues, citing Sandels, that since the crash 
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of 2008, public trust in government institutions and more specifically in the science of economics has 
fallen dramatically (Gillett, 2017).  This decline in trust is what fosters the turn to value-based 
arguments, as the factual sources have been increasingly perceived as untrustworthy.  It is this that 
explains why even though 9/10 economists argued for the remain campaign the public voted to 
leave, the economists expertise either was ignored or did not cut through for the public. (Gillett, 
2017). 
A range of surveys have long suggested that trust in democratic political institutions is not only 
weak, but in decline. The Edelman trust barometer indicates that trust in government is low, at 
thirty six percent and most people do no͛t feel their views are represented in politics today 
(Edelman, 2018). It is therefore notable ͞Rthat recent survey data demonstrates that government in 
BƌitaiŶ is peƌĐeiǀed as the least tƌustǁoƌthǇ puďliĐ authoƌitǇ͟ (Stoneman, 2008, p. 2).   
 Clearly distrust is important in all democracies since it maintains accountability for democratic 
institutions. As such, distrust in government and politics as a whole need not suggest a ͚post-tƌuth͛ 
condition.  
Trust in a politiĐal ĐoŶteǆt ĐaŶ ďe defiŶed as the ͞judgeŵeŶt of the ĐitizeŶƌǇ that the sǇsteŵ aŶd the 
political incumbents are responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant 
sĐƌutiŶǇ.͟ (Miller & Listhaug, 1990, p. 358) In practice the political elite create policies and they 
either receive trust from citizens who are satisfied with them or cynicism from those who are not 
(Citrin, 1974).  However, there is a tension between political trust and its acceptance as a pro-
deŵoĐƌatiĐ ǀalue aŶd the faĐt that ͞sĐeptiĐisŵ stiŵulates politiĐal eŶgageŵeŶt aŶd sigŶals a 
ǁilliŶgŶess to judge politiĐal iŶstitutioŶs ďǇ theiƌ oǁŶ ŵeƌits.͟ (Meer, 2017) On the other hand 
͞distrust, may inspire vigilance in and monitoring of a relationship, uncooperative behaviour, or the 
severing of a relationship. (Levi & Stoker, 2000)͟ Hoǁeǀeƌ, theƌe is a poiŶt ǁheƌe distƌust ƌesults iŶ 
uncooperative behaviour or at the extreme, the ending of a relationship. It is at this point that the 
post-truth condition can become apparent. The post-truth condition does not inspire vigilance but 
apathy and encourages uncooperative behaviour. If the British public have reached a point at which 
there is uncooperative behaviour, then a post-truth era becomes more evident.   
The decline in trust in politics in the UK may be fruitfully linked to the period during which it became 
a key concept in national political debates, during the 1990s.  As argued by Wheatcroft, Blair 
͞seeŵed Ŷot just a ďƌeath of fƌesh aiƌ ďut a tƌue ďƌeak ǁith the past, foƌ Bƌitish politiĐs as ǁell as foƌ 
Laďouƌ…Blaiƌ stepped foƌǁaƌd as staŶdaƌd-bearer for a new candour and decency, a man who would 
ŵoǀe Laďouƌ aǁaǇ fƌoŵ dogŵatiĐ soĐialisŵ ǁhile aǀoidiŶg the Toƌies' ŵeaŶspiƌitedŶess…Aďoǀe all, 
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he ǁas a ŵaŶ the Bƌitish Đould tƌust͟ (Wheatcroft, 2004).  A core element in the narrative of Blaiƌ͛s 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ǁas its peƌĐeiǀed tƌustǁoƌthiŶess. “toŶeŵaŶ states, ͞thƌoughout this peƌiod, oŶe ǁoƌd 
seeŵed to doŵiŶate the politiĐal laŶdsĐape: Tƌust͟ (Stoneman, 2008, p. 1).  In the UK 2001 general 
election, Tony Blair made a speeĐh iŶ ǁhiĐh he stated, ͞No-oŶe͛s suppoƌt should eǀeƌ ďe assuŵed. 
This is the stƌeŶgth of ouƌ deŵoĐƌaĐǇ….TodaǇ ǁe haǀe to eaƌŶ that tƌust agaiŶ… This eleĐtioŶ is 
about which party can be trusted with the economy, which party will invest more in our public 
seƌǀiĐes, ǁhiĐh paƌtǇ is Đapaďle of leadiŶg BƌitaiŶ iŶto the futuƌe.͟ (Blair, 2001) .The Blair 
government thus marked an expectant period in UK political history.  
A YouGov analysis looking at the trust of the public in politicians and journalists, notes the contrast 
in figures of trust before the Iraq War in 2003 and compared them to 2012 figures. The comparison 
which showed a fall in trust across the board.  Already Even in 2012 YouGov stated ͞IŶ shoƌt, 
something deeper is going on, that goes beyond the individual scandals involving journalism, war, 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt, MPs͛ eǆpeŶses, ďuƌeauĐƌaĐǇ, ďaŶkiŶg aŶd the poliĐe. TheǇ seeŵ to haǀe ĐoŵďiŶed to 
create a growing impression that virtually all those in positions of leadership are cynically in it for 
themselves, and less concerned with truth and the public good than they used to be – or we used to 
think͟ (Kellner, 2012) .  
The yearIt is interesting that 2003 has been chosen as theis the year of used as comparison for a 
reason, and it was within the following decade that trust continueds to fall. The debates leading up 
to the Iraq war were the first instance ultimately resulting in a decrease of trust among the public. In 
the Chilcot Report Sir John Chilcot stated that tThe actions of the government in the ͞“epteŵďeƌ 
ϮϬϬϮ dossieƌ oǀeƌstated the fiƌŵŶess of the eǀideŶĐe aďout IƌaƋ͛s Đapaďilities aŶd iŶteŶtioŶs iŶ 
order to influence opinion aŶd ͚ŵake the Đase͛ for action to disarm Iraq has produced a damaging 
legacy, including undermining trust and confidence in Government statements, particularly those 
which rely on intelligence which cannot be independently verified.͟ (Committee of Privy Counsellors, 
2016, p. 131).  
During pPolling carried out in 2003 asked ͞Do Ǉou thiŶk the UŶited “tates aŶd BƌitaiŶ aƌe / ǁeƌe 
ƌight oƌ ǁƌoŶg to take ŵilitaƌǇ aĐtioŶ agaiŶst IƌaƋ?͟, the percentage of people whothat felt the 
decision to go to war against Iraq waswas right did not drop below 40%,during 2003 and it peaked at 
66% in April when US troops entered Baghdad (YouGov, 2015).  This suggests tThere was clear 
support and trust in the government at this point in makingto make a relatively controversial 
decision to go to war. Yet, dDuring the general election campaign in 2005, when the people had 
more information at their disposal, this Ŷuŵďeƌ sǁaǇed to ͚ǁƌoŶg͛ at ϱϯ% (YouGov, 2015).  
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Opinion polls in the decade after the Iraq war indicate a steady decline in trust: ͞the ŵajoƌ doŵestiĐ 
legacy of the invasion of Iraq by US and UK forces in March 2003 has been a widespread and growing 
erosion of trust in the honesty and capacity of the politicians who triggered it. This lack of trust has 
been particularly significant for the Government in London elected as it was amid widespread 
eǆpeĐtatioŶ that it ǁould ďƌiŶg a Ŷeǁ aŶd higheƌ ŵoƌalitǇ to UK politiĐs͟ (Coates & Krieger, 2004, p. 
5). The public felt duped, and it felt that the system that was supposed to ensure accountability 
broke down.  
It has suggested that thisThe Iraq war constituted a historic turning point,. yet, the Iraq War alone 
cannot hold all responsibility for the decline in trust in the UK. Several other events impacted the 
apparently fragile trust of the British public. The 2008 recession also had significant implications for 
trust in government (Liesch, 2016). People hold the government accountable to manage the 
economy appropriately, and major financial crises such as the 2008 crisis suggest that the alleged 
experts do not know what they are doing. Since the crash of 2008, public trust in government 
institutions and more specifically in the science of economics has fallen dramatically (Gillett, 2017).  
Furthermore, in 2009 the MP expenses scandal personalised the issue of trust. It was no longer the 
system as a whole, but individuals who did not appear trustworthy. In the aftermath of the MPs 
expenses scandal an Ipsos MORI poll found that the puďliĐ͛s views towards MPs͛ motives were the 
worst they had ever measured, with 62% believing that MPs put their own interests first, and 76% 
did not trust MPs in general to tell the truth (Ipsos MORI, 2009).  
As articulated by Younge,In sum, public trust in the government and experts was hit several times by 
key events over the past decade, such as the Iraq war, and the 2008 financial crisisash, and the 2009 
MPs͛ eǆpeŶses sĐaŶdal. These eǀeŶtsthat rightly or wrongly caused the public to mistrust academics, 
politicians, journalists, and the system as a whole. .  It is natural for the public to mistrust someone 
who has given them incorrect information, however to then disregard all experts, forcing 
judgements and decisions to come from somewhere other than facts and rationality,  
would appear suggest the rise of a post-truth mentalityThe mistrust in traditional elites, their 
knowledge claims, and their expertise provided fertile ground for the spread of post-truth politics.  
In the context of the Brexit vote, this decline in trust was clearly a significant factor. Only 24% of 
respondents said expert, economist or academics influenced their decision on Brexit (whatukthinks, 
2016). . In the context of the Brexit vote, this decline in trust was clearly a significant factor. In the 
run up to the Brexit vote 46% of respondents felt that politicians across the campaign debates were 
͞mostly telling lies.͟ This compares to only 19% of respondents saying they were ͞mostly telling the 
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truth͟ (whatukthink, 2016).  Only 24% of respondents said experts, economists, or academics 
influenced their decision on Brexit, 20% were influenced by ͞Friends and Family͟, 15% by ͞British 
politicians,͟ and 45% by ͞none of these͟ (whatukthinks, 2016). Although 9/10 economists argued for 
the remain campaign, the public voted to leave the EU. The economists͛ expertise was either ignored 
or it did not even manage to get a public hearing, because of the technological changes and the 
changes in the media environment discussed above (Gillett, 2017).It is theƌefoƌe Ŷotaďle ͞that 
recent survey data demonstrates that government in Britain is perceived as the least trustworthy 
puďliĐ authoƌitǇ͟ (Stoneman, 2008, p. 2).   
Opinion polls in the decade after the Iraq war indicate a steady deĐliŶe iŶ tƌust, ͞the ŵajoƌ doŵestiĐ 
legacy of the invasion of Iraq by US and UK forces in March 2003 has been a widespread and growing 
erosion of trust in the honesty and capacity of the politicians who triggered it. This lack of trust has 
been particularly significant for the Government in London elected as it was amid widespread 
eǆpeĐtatioŶ that it ǁould ďƌiŶg a Ŷeǁ aŶd higheƌ ŵoƌalitǇ to UK politiĐs.͟ (Coates & Krieger, 2004, p. 
5) Here the implications is the public felt duped, and felt that the system that ensures accountability 
broke down.  Yet 
, the distrust against political elites and expert knowledge did not result in inaction, quite to the 
contrary, it resulted in a higher voter turnout, which lead to the UK voting to leave the European 
Union.   
The decline in trust towards traditional elites and expertise fostered the turn to value-based 
arguments, as the factual sources have been increasingly perceived as untrustworthy. If voters feel 
that they do not have enough reliable information to help them decide how to vote, they will 
naturally vote by personal conviction and on the basis of their emotions (Western, 2007). Clearly the 
Iraq War alone cannot hold all responsibility for the decline in trust in the UK. There have been 
several events that impacted the apparently fragile trust of the British public. Research carried out 
by Liesch showed that the electorate does withdraw its trust from government institution when 
there are problems with the economy, as such the 2008 recession is seen to have had significant 
implications for trust in government. (Liesch, 2016). In 2009 the MP expenses scandal personalised 
this issue, it was no longer the system but individuals who did not appear trustworthy. In the 
aftermath of the MPs expenses scandal an Ipsos MORI poll found that views towards MPs motives 
was the worst they had measured, with 62% believing that MPs put their own interests first, and 
76% did not trust MPs in general to tell the truth (Ipsos MORI, 2009).  
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Gillett (2017) argues that the Brexit referendum campaign as well as the 2016 US presidential 
election were debates in which ͞ǀalues ǁeƌe ďeing contested rather than facts͟ (Gillett, 2017). A rise 
in ͞value-based͟ decision making is revealed in polling in the lead up to the EU referendum which 
indicated voting intentions were based not on facts or evidence but on the ͞heart͟. In opinion polls 
only 17% of the public sampled said they will vote ͞100% with [their] head͟, 5% said ͞100% with my 
heart,͟ and 35% said ͞50% of each͟ (whatukthinks, 2016).  Evidence based considerations were, for 
many, no more important than gut instinct and emotion. The ͞resurgence of emotional narrative[s]͟ 
facilitated post-truth politics (Crilley, 2018).  
The result as defined by Suiter, of athis trend towards value-based voting and an increasing distrust 
in expertise i, was the rise of the expressive voter.  TEhe expressive voters areis a voters; 
͞…ǁho ǀote as part of their ideŶtitǇ, ǁho ǁaŶt to support the teaŵ. EŵotioŶal appeals are ofteŶ keǇ 
for these voters. They may justify their position in relation to some instrumental or policy related 
reason but this is not why they actually vote. Voters who feel ignored, let down and threatened by 
ĐhaŶge ĐaŶ staŶd up for theŵselǀes aŶd eǆpress their disĐoŶteŶt ďǇ ǀotiŶg for Truŵp or Farage…The 
faĐt that the poliĐies of a Truŵp or a Farage are uŶlikelǇ to ďeŶefit this group doesŶ͛t seeŵ to 
matter. The very low chance that their individual vote will actually make a difference makes the 
support seeŵ alŵost Đostless aŶd alloǁs the ǀoter to put oŶe fiŶger up to the estaďlishŵeŶt͟ (Suiter, 
2016, p. 26).   
This, for Suiter is what makes distrust in government a symptom of post-truth. Not the distrust 
alone, but the public response. Since 2003 the public hasve been moving further away from trusting 
the government, but whatand itthis has been replaced bywith is an electorate who feels let down by 
their government. It wast, and were thus prone to view the referendum on UK membership of the 
European Union as a vote of no confidence on the entire political elite. Whether this is best 
interpreted as marking a new post truth era seems debatable. The pattern of declining trust which 
contextualised the Brexit vote is hardly new. The turn to value-based decision making has reflected a 
generalised distrust of expert and official messages, and has moved away from a healthy distrust in 
politics, to a more dangerous one. Dangerous may be an exaggeration to those who voted for Brexit, 
and in a sense the actual issues of Brexit is not the proof of a post-truth era. Deciding to leave or stay 
are both equally valid choices and is not what is in question here. What is, and what has been clearly 
demonstrated is the way that the public came to the conclusions they did, is perhaps indicative of a 
post-truth era.  
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As Bogdaner stated, fFollowing the publicly mandated policy recommendation of Brexit, was the first 
time the House of Commons had  would have to vote for something despite a majority of MPs 
personally opposed toing it for the first time in its history  (Bogdanor, 2018).  This end is what has 
been defined as post-truth, where truth is of secondary importance to the disillusioned electorate 
determined to vote with what makes them feel good or following ingrained beliefs. A pattern of 
declining trust would appear to combine with truth becoming more difficult to identify and evaluate 
online, but equally the electorate do not seek it out..  In the context of the Brexit vote, this decline in 
trust was clearly a significant factor. Only 24% of respondents said expert, economist or academics 
influenced their decision on Brexit (whatukthinks, 2016). 
Elites Fight Back 
The British government seeks to fight back against misinformation campaigns, and to hold especially 
the digital media sphere accountable to the same standards as broadcasting and print media. The 
Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport released an interim report on ͞Disinformation and 
͚fake Ŷeǁs͛͟ ͞recommending the government work with experts to create credible standards for 
information that adapt to deal with the fast-moving technological developments͟ (Digital, Culture, 
Media and Sport Committee, 2018, p. 64). The government argued in this interim report that the 
consequences can be ͞devastating͟ if rumours and ͞fake news͟ continue to spread on social media, 
and it acknowledges that motives could include influencing political elections (Digital, Culture, Media 
and Sport Committee, 2018).  
Platforms such as Facebook have come under fire for failing to effectively manage or exercise 
oversight regarding the factual basis of online content (Gibbons, 2018). Cross-party MPs were 
recently quoted arguing tech firms like Facebook, Twitter and Google should be held legally 
accountable for the distribution of false content on their sites (Buchan, 2018). Social media 
companies are being forced to react with Facebook announcing an expansion of fact-checking and 
efforts to prevent misleading memes from going viral in advance of the US midterm elections 
(Facebook, 2018). Twitter has suspended 770 accounts to also crackdown on fake news (Bernal, 
2018). 
Yet, a high volume of posts, on average 6,000 per second, will inevitably leave a lot of potentially 
incorrect information ͞in the wild͟ (Bontcheva, 2018). Alternatively, a platform could intervene in 
cases which do not require censorship, and accurate information could get removed from the public 
domain. In extreme circumstances this could represent a breach of the freedom of speech. Other 
political actors might, in turn, iŶstƌuŵeŶtalise the teƌŵ ͞fake Ŷeǁs,͟ just as DoŶald Tƌuŵp does, aŶd 
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thus strategically aim to render it meaningless. In short, there are ongoing struggles about 
establishing truth claims in politics, and while one referendum does not mean that we have reached 
a post-truth era, the Brexit referendum suggests that post-truth politics represents a serious threat 
to democracy as we know it.  The UK government DCMS͛s interim report on DisiŶforŵatioŶ aŶd ͚fake 
Ŷeǁs͛ in July 2018 argued that the ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes ĐaŶ ďe ͚deǀastatiŶg͛ if soĐial ŵedia is used to 
spƌead ƌuŵouƌs aŶd ͚fake Ŷeǁs͛ aŶd aĐkŶoǁledges that ŵotiǀes Đould iŶĐlude iŶflueŶĐiŶg politiĐal 
elections (Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2018).  
 
 
Conclusion 
The combination of a technological changes resulting in widespread social media usage and 
consequently a significant change in the media environment, revolution compounded with public 
distrust in traditional political and media elites, and expert knowledge, have formed the conditions 
of possibility for a post-truth politics to emerge, and this post-truth politics has had a significant 
impact on the public debate leading up to the Brexit referendum, and the UK͛s people ǀote to eǆit 
the European Union. Technologicaly developments have clearly plaid an important role, as social 
media remove the role of traditional media to operate as gatekeepers of accuracy in the media 
environment. What is more, on social media messages spread on the basis of how much novelty 
they generate and how much arousal they create, not on the basis of how accurate they are. Social 
media thus provide fertile grounds for the spread of post-truth politics. It is worth studying whether 
anything has changed in the current political environment in the UK, before launching requests for a 
second referendum. Another referendum under the same circumstances only runs the risk of 
accentuating the same trends.  clearly plays a considerable role in modern day politics and Lynch 
convincingly articulates the way information is spread irrespective of its reliability is an embodiment 
of this. 
Political elites and the media (social media included for fear of tarnishing their reputation) have 
responded to the threat of post-truth politics, by establishing fact checkers, seeking to regulate 
social media sites, and developing algorithms which are supposed to detect fake news. These are 
laudable efforts, and they might provide some checks on the uninhibited spread of fake news. Yet, 
the evidence that the UK͛s politiĐal elites aŶd eǆpeƌts aƌe at the tail end of a significant decline in 
trust should give us pause.  A political crisis of trust has been developing for more than a decade and 
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is now well entrenched within the population. This decline of trust is significant and has uniquely hit 
governments, politicians, experts, and traditional media gatekeepers. As a result, voters make 
emotionally charged and value-laden decisions, often based on information which has been 
designed to generate emotional arousal and is inaccurate. Technically preventing the spread of fake 
Ŷeǁs ǁill Ŷot ďe eŶough to ƌestoƌe the puďliĐ͛s tƌust iŶ soĐietal elites.  
seem to provide some, if limited, evidence for a post-truth condition.  The term post-truth perhaps 
distracts from the underlying issues within UK politics. Contemporary discussions surrounding a 
second referendum, run the risk of accentuating these trends. Denying the public what they voted 
for would be a blow to the state of democracy and result in an even further deterioration of trust 
(Frayne, 2018). Claims made journalist and commentators like d͛AŶĐoŶa that the iŶteƌŶet has 
perpetuated a condition where truth has lost its value seem overstated as simple explanations for 
the Brexit vote. Technology clearly plays a considerable role in modern day politics and Lynch 
convincingly articulates the way information is spread irrespective of its reliability is an embodiment 
of this.  
The way the government and the media react to the concept of the post-truth era is important. The 
rise of the fact checker has been a positive outworking of the trust issues the public are making 
evident. Social media companies are also being forced to react with Facebook announcing an 
expansion of fact-checking and efforts to prevent misleading memes from going viral in advance of 
the US midterm elections (Facebook, 2018). Twitter has suspended 770 accounts to also crackdown 
on fake news (Bernal, 2018).  Actions like this are encouraging in the pursuit of truth especially 
politically, but there is a risk. There is often a trade-off and the desire by companies to ensure they 
are regulating (at least in some manner) their users, could run the risk of impeding freedom of 
speech. At the same time, scholars of politics and international relations need to acknowledge that 
the population plays an active role in these developments. Ultimately, fake news spread because 
individual users decide to share, tweet, and respond to them. Individual users decide to use social 
media for acquiring information, they decide not to verify the sources that are emitting that 
information, and they vote based on value-laden decisions. Scholars need to pay heightened 
attention to the people as active shapers, not just passive recipients, of the political regimes they 
live in. 
Ultimately, the public need to be informed and educated about the conditions that underwrite 
proclamations of a post-truth era and recognise their role in their creation and here I agree with 
Higgins and her emphasis on awareness as the solution (Higgins, 2016).  The evidence that the UK is 
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at the tail end of a significant decline in trust should give us pause.  A political crisis of trust has been 
developing for decades and is now well entrenched within the population. The form of democracy is 
clearly not satisfying the public anymore.  It is this that I believe is beyond the simple ebbs and flow 
of a democratic society. This decline of trust is significant and has uniquely hit both governments 
and experts. The media gatekeepers are equally not trusted, which leaves actions based on value-
based decisions, with whatever information is decided by a reader to be reliable.  This compounded 
with technological changes is what makes this a post-truth era. Individually all of these factors are 
perhaps not new and definitely do not warrant the declaration of a new era. However, when you 
end up with a public disillusioned with the government and experts, a gatekeeper that no longer 
does its job and technology that makes any information easily accessible; it is then that the idea of a 
post-truth era can be entertained. Further consideration needs to be given into the reasons behind 
the puďliĐ͛s distƌust iŶ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt aŶd politiĐiaŶs, to fully recognise and therefore address the 
challenge to democracy that we are being faced today.   
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